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        n September 16, 2016, Ukraine served Russia with notification it had 
instituted a case for arbitration under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 for events 
occurring in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Strait.2 Arising from 
a separate incident, but linked directly to the conflict over Crimea, on April 
1, 2019, Ukraine filed arbitral proceedings against Russia under Annex VII 
for its detention of three Ukrainian naval vessels and their crews3 and on 
April 16 filed an application for provisional measures before the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) pursuant to Article 290 of 
UNCLOS.4 The common thread in these three cases is the conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia over sovereignty in Crimea. The simmering tensions 
over Crimea date back to the USSR’s dissolution in 1991, which later erupted 
in 2014 with Russia’s military intervention and annexation of Crimea. The 
conflict has now found its way to international tribunals, adding a new legal 
dimension to the history of the Black Sea and Crimea. 
Conflict and power struggle in the Black Sea has a long history. It has 
given the Black Sea a rich history in international law dating back to early 
treaties concluded between the Ottoman and Russian empires that have 
shaped the region. The most influential treaty adopted during the twentieth 
century is, without doubt, the 1936 Montreux Convention.5 It creates a 
unique regime that imposes restrictions on the size and type of warships al-
lowed in and out of the Black Sea and imposes limits on the duration of the 
stay of warships of non-Black Sea States. The Black Sea regime created under 
 
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, annex VII, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
2. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch 
Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06, PCA Case Repository, Preliminary Objections, 
Award, ¶¶ 2, 8, (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2020) [hereinafter Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights 
Award]. 
3. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Order of 
May 25, 2019, at 2, ¶ 1, ITLOS Rep.  
4. Immunity of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels and the Twenty-Four Servicemen on 
Board (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 26, Request for Provisional Measures Submitted by Ukraine 
(Apr. 16, 2019).  
5. Convention regarding the Régime of the Straits, July 20, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 213 











the Montreux Convention has roots in the ancient rule of the Ottoman sul-
tans and the Soviet legal doctrine of “closed sea.”6 The Montreux Conven-
tion reflects the view, especially that of the USSR, that the Black Sea is legally 
a closed sea, at least to foreign warships. The Soviet Union took this position 
during the 1923 Lausanne Treaty negotiations on the regime to govern the 
Turkish Straits7and later during the Montreux Convention negotiations.8 The 
closed sea doctrine reflected Russia’s geopolitical interest in the Black Sea. 
The existing conflictual situation in the Black Sea is very much a conse-
quence of the geopolitical power structure of the Black Sea, which for cen-
turies was shared between the two major Black Sea empires, later replaced 
by the USSR and Turkey.  
While the USSR’s dissolution may have raised hope for a new era of 
geopolitics turning the Black Sea into a Euro-NATO sphere of influence, 
this was dashed by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, followed by the Rus-
sian-Ukraine conflict that began in 2014. It is Russia’s historic geopolitical 
interest in the Black Sea that is an underlying reason for the present conflicts 
with Ukraine, which, in turn, led to the three cases. 
In the next Part, this article traces the history of the Black Sea and Crimea 
from the period of empires through the Cold War era. Part III examines the 
shifting of influence in the Black Sea that took place following the 1991 dis-
solution of the USSR, the changed status of the Black Sea Fleet, and the early 
kernels of tension over Crimea between Russia and Ukraine, including 
NATO and the European Union’s growing influence in the Black Sea. Part 
IV focuses on the unsettled navigation and delimitation issues between Rus-
sia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov, and the events in Crimea in 2014 between 
Russia and Ukraine, which eventually lead Ukraine to bring the two arbitra-
tion cases under Annex VII of UNCLOS and a request for provisional or-
ders before ITLOS. Part V examines the legal issues raised by the Russian 
Federation’s preliminary objections on the jurisdictional competence of the 
arbitral tribunal to decide the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black 
Sea, Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait case, followed by an analysis of the tribunal’s 
award of provisional measures in the Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels 
 
6. See Joseph J. Darby, The Soviet Doctrine of the Closed Sea, 23 SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
685 (1986).  
7. Convention Respecting the Regime of the Straits, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 115, 
reprinted in 18 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 53 (1924) [here-
inafter 1923 Lausanne Straits Treaty]. 
8. See NILUFER ORAL, REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND PROTECTION OF THE MARINE 











case decided by ITLOS. The real issue in these cases is whether Ukraine or 
Russia has sovereignty over Crimea, but the legal analysis is skillfully couched 
within the language of UNCLOS.  
This article will not analyze the events themselves but rather trace the 
evolution of the conflict from the period of the empires through the Cold 
War and post-Cold War period. Ukraine has taken a bold step in taking the 
power rivalry of the Black Sea and Crimea before international tribunals for 
arbitration, adding a new legal dimension to the Black Sea region’s complex 
history. 
 
II. THE REGIME OF THE BLACK SEA FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO 
THE USSR 
 
The Black Sea is rich in legal history, providing an important context to the 
current conflict in the Black Sea, Crimea, the Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait. 
For some three centuries, the Black Sea was under the Ottoman Empire’s 
sole control (1452–1774). While Russian Tsar Peter the Great was the first 
to pierce the walls of the “Ottoman Black Sea,”9 it was Catherine the Great 
who left a lasting legacy for Russia, especially in Crimea. The 1774 Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca between the Russian and Ottoman governments10 marked 
a historical precedent. For the first time, the Ottomans allowed foreign-
flagged merchant vessels free and unhindered navigational rights in the Black 
Sea and what are now known as the Turkish Straits, as well as free access to 
Ottoman ports.11 The Treaty ceded to Russia in perpetuity the fortresses of 
Yeni Kale and Kerch along the coast of the Crimean Peninsula. It also gave 
 
9. Tsar Peter the Great captured the fortress of Azov following the war of 1695–96, 
also known as “the Azov campaigns,” and established a naval base at the city of Taganrog. 
The tsar’s access to the Black Sea was limited, however. As the Ottomans still controlled 
the Kerch Strait, the tsar’s ships were confined to the Sea of Azov. BRIAN L. DAVIES, WAR-
FARE, STATE AND SOCIETY ON THE BLACK SEA STEPPE, 1500–1700, at 186–87 (2007). 
10. Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Amity, Russ.-Ottoman Empire, July 10, 1774, 45 
Consol. T. S. 349. The provisions were far-reaching, making the Crimean khanate independ-
ent of the Ottoman Empire. It granted territorial tights to Russia by advancing the Russian 
frontier southward, assigned Russia rights of protection of the rights of Christians and of 
the Church in the Ottoman Empire, and gave Russia the right to maintain a fleet on the 
Black Sea. 
11. Id. at 392 (“For the convenience and advantage of the two Empires there will be 
free and unobstructed navigation for the merchant vessels, belonging to the two contracting 
powers.”) Translation taken from M.L. Harvey, The Development of Russian Commerce 
on the Black Sea and its Significance 17 (1938) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 











Russia the right to maintain a fleet in the Black Sea. Thus, Russia had gained 
a permanent foothold in the Black Sea and inaugurated its new role as a Black 
Sea power. The Ottoman power in the Crimean Peninsula having waned 
allowed Catherine the Great to annex Crimea in 1783 when she also had 
General Potemkin create the Black Sea fleet in Akhtiar, which would later be 
named Sevastopol. 12 In 1792, Crimea, in its entirety, would formally pass to 
Russia under the Treaty of Jassy13 following the Ottoman Empire’s defeat in 
the Russo-Turkish War of 1792. Since then, Russia has retained a consider-
able presence in the Black Sea. 
Under the USSR’s rule, the Soviet position regarding the Black Sea was 
reflected in the closed sea doctrine, namely that in semi-enclosed or enclosed 
seas, coastal States should enjoy superior legal rights over non-coastal 
States.14 This meant that passage rights of foreign ships were to be estab-
lished exclusively by the littoral States’ concurrence. Non-contiguous States 
would have no legal rights of access unless expressly granted by the coastal 
States.15 The doctrine was put forth by the well-known Soviet jurist, F.I. Ko-
jevnikov, a former judge at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), who, in 
1948, wrote that a distinction had to be made between the high seas and 
closed seas such as the Black Sea and only the littoral States could determine 
the legal regime of closed seas.16  
 
12. MUNGO MELVIN, SEVASTOPOL’S WARS: CRIMEA FROM POTEMKIN TO PUTIN 60, 
64–65 (2017); ROBERT WEINBERG, THE REVOLUTION OF 1905 IN ODESSA: BLOOD ON THE 
STEPS 2 (1993). 
13. Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey, signed at Jassy, Jan. 9, 1792, 51 C.T.S. 
279. The Treaty was signed at the end of the Russian-Turkish war of 1787–91 and confirmed 
the annexation of Crimea and Kuban to the Russian Empire and established the Russian-
Turkish border along the Dniester River. 
14. Richard E. Bradshaw, The Politics of Soviet Maritime Security, 10 JOURNAL OF MARI-
TIME LAW AND COMMERCE 411, 422–23 (1978–79). 
15. Darby, supra note 6, at 690. 
16. “[I]l faudrait également distinguer de la haute mer les mers fermées parmi 
lesquelles on range par exemple la mer Noire dont le régime juridique ne doit évidemment 
être déterminé que par les seuls états riverains.” [“[I] t should also distinguish from the 
high seas the closed seas among which we include, for example, the Black Sea, whose legal 
regime must obviously be determined only by the riparian States.”] Cited in FRANCE DE 
HARTINGH, LES CONCEPTIONS SOVIÉTIQUES DU DROIT DE LA MER [SOVIET CONCEP-











The closed sea doctrine was evoked as early as the 1921 Treaty of Friend-
ship concluded between Turkey and the USSR.17 The Treaty expressly sup-
ports the distinction between littoral and non-littoral States and includes a 
provision for the Black Sea littoral States to meet at a future date to jointly 
agree upon the legal status of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits.18 It also 
illustrates that, despite their historical rivalry, Turkey and Russia shared a 
common position in maintaining the closure of the Black Sea to foreign na-
val powers. This policy was formally codified in the Lausanne Treaty on the 
Straits.19 That Treaty was subsequently replaced by the Montreux Conven-
tion, which continues in effect today.20 Both negotiations were marked by 
the Soviet policy to make the Black Sea a “closed sea.”21 During the 1923 
Lausanne Treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union, as expressively declared in 
the Soviet counter draft, insisted on having the Black Sea recognized as a 
closed sea.22 The Soviet representative at the Lausanne negotiations, Foreign 
Minister Maxim Litvinov, argued forcibly in favor of keeping the straits 
closed to foreign warships for the security of the entire Black Sea, pointing 
out that the Black Sea was a closed sea and did not provide a transit route to 
other countries.23 
The Soviets reiterated this view at the Montreux Convention negotia-
tions when Russian Foreign Minister Chicherine referred to the Black Sea as 
a closed sea and “cul de sac.”24 The Convention regulates the passage of both 
 
17. Treaty of Friendship, Russ.-Turk, Mar. 16, 1921, reprinted in 1 SOVIET TREATY SE-
RIES 1917–1928: A COLLECTION OF BILATERAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND CONVEN-
TIONS, ETC., CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND FOREIGN POWERS 100 
(Leonard Shapiro ed., 1950). 
18. In the Treaty of Friendship, the parties agreed to “entrust the final elaboration of 
an international agreement concerning the Black Sea to a conference composed of the del-
egates of the littoral states.” Id. art. V (emphasis added). 
19. 1923 Lausanne Straits Treaty, supra note 7.  
20. See 1936 Montreux Convention, supra note 5. 
21. See ORAL, REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVI-
RONMENT, supra note 8, at 26–27. 
22. Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Soviet Doctrine of Mare Clausum and Policies in Black and 
Baltic Seas, 14 JOURNAL OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 339, 341 (1955). The author ob-
served that it was during the 1923 Lausanne Conference on the status of the Black Sea that 
the Russians for the first time invoked the closed sea doctrine. Id. at 344. 
23. SEHA L. MERAY & OSMAN OLCAY, MONTREUX BOGAZLAR KONFERANSI: TU-
TANAKLAR, BELGELER [MONTREUX STRAITS CONFERENCE: MINUTES, DOCUMENTS] 40 
(1976). 
24. FERENC A. VALI, THE TURKISH STRAITS AND NATO 32 (1972). Chicherine re-












merchant and warships through the Turkish Straits. However, its most im-
portant function is the regulation of the passage of warships into and out of 
the Black Sea. These are the qualities that make the Black Sea a quasi-closed 
sea. While allowing merchant vessels freedom of navigation, the Convention 
imposes conditions and restrictions on the warships’ passage, including sub-
marines, of both Black Sea and non-Black Sea States through the Turkish 
Straits. However, as control over the straits under the Montreux Convention 
remains exclusively with Turkey, the closed sea doctrine does not apply in 
the Black Sea. Still, some aspects of it are present because of the restrictions 
on passage. 
Since the Black Sea remains an open sea for all foreign merchant vessels 
but not warships,25 the Montreux Convention regime can be described as a 
closed sea or semi-closed sea regarding the right of access of foreign war-
ships. The Convention imposes unique limitations on access to the Black Sea 
by warships of non-Black Sea littoral States. It significantly limits the type of 
vessels, tonnage, and the number of foreign warships allowed entry at any 
one time.26 Prior notification to Turkey is required during peacetime, and 
visits of foreign warships are limited to twenty-one days.27 During the Crimea 
crisis of 2014, Russia had protested, claiming that Turkey had violated the 
Montreux Convention by allowing the USS Taylor to stay eleven days over 
the twenty-one-day limit, on the grounds of a mechanical breakdown.28  
 
III. SHIFT IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE BLACK SEA              
FOLLOWING THE DISSOLUTION OF THE USSR 
 
With the USSR’s dissolution in 1991, the Black Sea’s historical two-power 
structure between the Ottoman and Russian empires and later Turkey and 
the USSR was replaced by five new independent Black Sea littoral States: the 
Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, and Georgia. The historic 
 
similar to other straits. He pointed out that they did not provide a passage between two high 
seas but served only as an exit and entry into a closed sea. In support of his argument Chiche-
rine quoted from a book written in French which described the Black Sea as a cul de sac 
and internal sea. See also MERAY & OLCAY, supra note 23, at 165. 
25. 1936 Montreux Convention, supra note 5, art. 10. 
26. Id. art. 14. 
27. Id. art. 18. 













Belovezha Accords of December 8, 1991, formally ended the USSR’s exist-
ence and created the Commonwealth of Independent States.29 The Russian 
Federation asserted its claim as the successor State to the USSR and in-
formed other States with whom the USSR had concluded multilateral treaties 
that it would continue to exercise the rights and fulfill the obligations of the 
USSR.30 
The dissolution of the USSR brought major changes to the world. This 
included the Black Sea region that was changing quickly and seemed to be 
transitioning into the Western orbit. Previously, Turkey was the only State 
bordering the Black Sea in NATO, a collective defense alliance against the 
USSR and expansion of communism created under the 1949 North Atlantic 
Treaty.31 With the dissolution, the European Union and NATO were quick 
to open membership to former members of the USSR, including Black Sea 
littoral States.32 Currently, three of the six Black Sea littoral States, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, are full NATO members. Georgia and Ukraine par-
ticipate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program,33 and Georgia is an offi-
cial candidate for NATO membership.  
 
29. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States pmbl., Belr.-
Russ.-Ukr., Dec. 8, 1991, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 143 (1992) [hereinafter 
Belovezha Accords] (“the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality 
no longer exists”). Article 1 provided, “The High Contracting Parties shall constitute the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).” It was followed by the signing of the Alma 
ATA Protocol on December 21, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mol-
dova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as parties. Protocol to the Agreement Es-
tablishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MATERIALS 147 (1992) [hereinafter Alma ATA Protocol]. 
30. The Russian Federation also continued to exercise the USSR’s rights and obligations 
in international organizations, including its permanent membership in the Security Council 
of the United Nations. See AD HOC COMMITTEE OF LEGAL ADVISERS ON PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW, PRELIMINARY DRAFT REPORT ON THE PILOT PROJECT OF THE COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE ON STATE PRACTICE REGARDING STATE SUCCESSION AND ISSUES OF RECOG-
NITION 41 (1998), https://rm.coe.int/168004a360. 
31. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. The signatory 
countries were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Turkey became a 
member in 1952. The Treaty provided for the collective security of the member countries 
in accordance with the U.N. Charter.  
32. The European Union moved quickly to open membership to Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, which were admitted in 2004. 
33. See Partners for Peace Programme, NATO, https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partner-











During this period, the opening up of the Black Sea region to Western 
influence through NATO and the European Union resulted in changes to 
the delicate balance of power drawn by history and the 1936 Montreux Con-
vention. From a legal perspective, one of the limits on NATO’s activities in 
the Black Sea is the existing legal regime under the Montreux Convention on 
naval ships of non-Black Sea littoral States. A second limitation is a diplo-
matic one—the Russian response to NATO’s increased activity in the Black 
Sea, which it views as a threat to the existing regional stability.34 
The tensions were only exacerbated by the annexation of Crimea and 
events during the Russia-Georgia conflict. In the latter, in early August 2009, 
during the localized conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia sent 
armed forces to support South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet established a so-called “maritime security zone” to deny access to 
Georgian ports.35 In the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the NATO members agreed 
to “deepen [NATO’s] focus on security in the Black Sea region” and support 
Georgia’s territorial integrity and security.36  
Similarly, in April 2019, the NATO foreign ministers decided to enhance 
their practical support to Ukraine, including cooperation with its navy.37 
Consequently, several non-Black Sea NATO members, including the United 
States, stepped up their presence in the region.38 This followed NATO’s con-
demnation of the events of November 25, 2018, where vessels of the Russian 
Coast Guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempt-
ing to pass from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov through the Kerch Strait 
on their way to the port of Mariupol.39 
 
 
34. Russia to Respond in Kind to NATO Plans in Black Sea—Diplomat, TASS, (Apr. 14, 
2019), https://tass.com/politics/1053577. 
35. 2 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON 
THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 212 (2009).  
36. Press Release, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8–9 July 
2016, ¶¶ 112–13, NATO Press Release (2016) 100 (July 9, 2016). 
37. Press Release, Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, ¶ 8, NATO Press 
Release (2019) 111 (Oct. 31, 2019). 
38. For example, two U.S. warships conducted maritime security operations in the 
Black Sea in June 2020. NATO Allied Ships Patrol in the Black Sea, NATO (June 18, 2020), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_176708.htm#:~:text=The%20United%20St
ates%20Navy%20dock,the%20Black%20Sea%20on%20Wednesday. 












IV. CURRENT CONFLICTS IN THE BLACK SEA REGION 
 
A. Crimea and Control of the Black Sea Fleet 
 
The Russian annexation of Crimea—or according to Russia, its accession 
following a referendum40—in addition to the obvious sovereignty questions, 
created uncertainties as to the ultimate control of the Black Sea Fleet by the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine.41 Historically, the Russian presence in the 
Black Sea is intimately linked with the creation of the first Black Sea Fleet in 
the port of Sevastopol, a city and naval base on the southwest of the Crimean 
Peninsula, established by Prince Potemkin in 1783.42 In 1954, President 
Khrushchev “gave” Crimea to Ukraine to celebrate the three hundredth an-
niversary of Ukrainian and Russian relations.43 The 1991 Belovezha Accords 
recognized the territorial integrity and the inviolability of the existing borders 
within the Commonwealth. 44 At the time, Ukraine’s borders included the 
Crimea. However, in 1992 the Russian Federation, while claiming not to 
challenge Ukraine’s sovereignty, stated that the transfer of Crimea by 
Khrushchev in 1954 was invalid as it had not been recorded.45 
 
40. Ukraine Crisis: Putin Signs Russian-Crimea Treaty, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26630062. 
41. Rasmus Nilsson, Russian Policy Concerning the Black Sea Fleet and its Being Based in 
Ukraine, 2008–2010: Three Interpretations, (2013) 65 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1154 (2013); Vic-
tor Zaborksy, Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet in Russian-Ukrainian Relations (Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity, CSIA Discussion Paper 95-11, 1995), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/de-
fault/files/legacy/files/disc_paper_95_11.pdf. 
42. Sevastapol, ENCYLCOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/places/com-
monwealth-independent-states-and-baltic-nations/cis-and-baltic-political-geography/se-
vastopol (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
43. Adam Taylor, To Understand Crimea, Take a Look Back at Its History, WASHINGTON 
POST (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/ 
27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/. 
44. Belovezha Accord, supra note 29, art. 5. 
45. Kendall Butterworth, Successor States - Property Rights - Russia and Ukraine Agree to Share 
Control of the Former Soviet Union’s Black Sea Fleet, 22 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 659, 661 n.7 (1992); Calamur Krishnadev, Crimea: A Gift To 
Ukraine Becomes A Political Flash Point, NPR (Feb. 27, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/parallels/2014/02/27/283481587/crimea-a-gift-to-ukraine-becomes-a-political-
flash-point; Carey Goldberg, Giving Crimea to Ukraine Was Illegal, Russians Rule: Commonwealth: 
Parliament’s Vote Brings Tensions between the Two Powers Close to the Boiling Point, LOS ANGELES 












From the onset, control over the Black Sea Fleet was a source of tension 
between Ukraine and Russia, each vying to control the Black Sea Fleet.46 The 
two parties concluded three major agreements in May 1997, where they par-
titioned the Black Sea Fleet between themselves in order to create independ-
ent national fleets.47 Under the terms of the agreements, Russia maintained 
control over most of the fleet and the right to use the port of Sevastopol for 
twenty years until 2017. In 2010, the two parties further agreed to extend the 
Russian navy stay in Crimea to 2042.48 
The previous legal arrangements over the Black Sea Fleet were put aside 
in 2014, with the eruption of a new crisis when the pro-Russian Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych fled mass public protests in Ukraine. In March 
2014, Russia took military control of Crimea on the grounds it was protect-
ing Russians, then held a referendum for the local population to determine 
Crimea’s status as Russian or Ukrainian.49 Consequently, decades after 
Khrushchev had “gifted” Crimea to Ukraine, Crimea, together with the port 
of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, returned to Russia. The ramifications 
of Crimea falling under Russian control were particularly significant for the 
status of the Black Sea Fleet. In April 2014, Russia unilaterally terminated 
the 1997 and 2010 agreements.50 Shortly after that, Russia announced plans 
to expand its fleet by adding thirty new warships during the next six years, 
 
46. Butterworth, supra note 45, at 661, 665–66. 
47. There were a total of three agreements: Parameters of the Division of the Black Sea 
Fleet, Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 1997; Partition Treaty on the Status and Conditions of the Rus-
sian Federation Black Sea Fleet’s Stay on the Territory of Ukraine, Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 
1997; Payments Associated with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and Its Presence 
on the Territory of Ukraine, Russ.-Ukr., May 28, 1997. 
48. Agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Presence 
of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine, Russ.-Ukr., Apr. 21, 
2010. 
49. Following a referendum held on March 16, 2014, on March 17, President Putin 
signed an executive order recognizing the Republic of Crimea as a “sovereign and independ-
ent state, whose city of Sevastopol has a special status.” Putin Formally Recognizes Crimea as an 
Independent State, iPOLITICS (May 17, 2014), https://ipolitics.ca/2014/03/17/u-s-eu-an-
nounce-expanded-sanctions-following-vote-in-crimea/. Crimea was officially admitted into 
the Russian Federation on March 18. See Contract Between the Russian Federation and 
Republic of Crimea, Mar. 18, 2014. For a partial unofficial English translation, see 
https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=67094. 
50. Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Termination of the Agreements Gov-
erning the Presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet in the Territory of Ukraine, 
Russian Federation Collection of Legislation 2004, No. 38-FZ. For an unofficial English 












contrary to the previous agreements, which only allowed Russia to do ship-
for-ship swaps.51 It was also reported that during the annexation, Russian 
flags were raised on some Ukrainian naval vessels and personnel and equip-
ment of Ukrainian military units taken over by Russia.52 
 
B. Unresolved Issues of Navigation and Delimitation in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch 
Strait 
 
Following Russia’s military intervention in Crimea in 2014, the legal status 
and delimitation of the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov remained unre-
solved and are currently disputed by the parties.53  
The Sea of Azov is a small shallow body of water connected to the Black 
Sea through the Kerch Strait. Until 1991, it was accepted as the internal wa-
ters of Russia. It was only after the 1991 dissolution of the USSR and the 
emergence of Ukraine and the Russian Federation as independent States that 
that status was questioned.54 
Following the dissolution, Ukraine and Russia failed to reach an agree-
ment on the drawing of boundaries in the Sea of Azov, including those of 
the Kerch Strait. An agreement on cooperation on the use of the Sea of Azov 
and the Kerch Strait concluded in December 2003 did not settle the delimi-
tation question but did recognize that the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait 
 
51. John C.K. Daly, Hot Issue: After Crimea: The Future of the Black Sea Fleet, JAMESTOWN 
FOUNDATION (May 22, 2014), https://jamestown.org/program/hot-issue-after-crimea-
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52. Peter Roudik, Russia; Ukraine: Legislature Adopts Law on Dissolution of Black Sea Fleet 
Treaties, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/ar-
ticle/russia-ukraine-legislature-adopts-law-on-dissolution-of-black-sea-fleet-treaties/. 
53. Alexander Skaridov, The Sea of Azov and Kerch Straits, in NAVIGATING STRAITS: 
CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (David D. Caron & Nilufer Oral eds., 2014). 
Valentin J. Schatz & Dmytro Koval, Russia’s Annexation of Crimea and the Passage of Ships 
Through Kerch Strait: A Law of the Sea Perspective, 50 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 275, 278 (2019). 











were historically internal waters of Russia and Ukraine.55 The agreement pro-
vided the right of freedom of navigation for Ukraine and Russian vessels,56 but 
not third-party merchant vessels. Foreign merchant vessels could only pass 
through the Kerch Strait if navigating to ports of Ukraine or Russia.57 For-
eign military and State vessels could only enter the Sea of Azov upon invita-
tion or by permission.58 However, the agreement did not indicate the respon-
sible authority for granting such permission and other conditions of naviga-
tion, such as the duration of the stay and number of vessels permitted to be 
present.59 
Therefore, the 2003 cooperation agreement left uncertainties as to the 
regulation of navigation in the Sea of Azov and the delimitation of the 
boundaries in the region.60 The incident on November 25, 2018, in which 
the Russian Coast Guard fired upon and captured three Ukrainian navy ves-
sels passing through the Kerch Strait on their way to the port of Mariupol in 
the Sea of Azov brought these issues back to light. The Kerch Strait is the 
only waterway connecting the Sea of Azov with the Black Sea and separates 
Crimea in the west from the Taman Peninsula in the east.61 As discussed 
below, the legal status of the Sea of Azov under UNCLOS is crucial to de-
termine the legality of the Russian actions. Thus, the question of whether the 
waters of the Sea of Azov are internal waters outside the scope of the UN-
CLOS or a semi-enclosed sea under Article 122 would be one of the many 
 
55. Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine on Cooperation in the 
use of the Sea of Azov and the Strait of Kerch art. 1, Russ.-Ukr., Dec. 24, 2003, 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/shared/faolextrans.jsp?xp_FAOLEX=LEX-FAOC045795 
&xp_faoLexLang=E&xp_lang=en [hereinafter Agreement on Cooperation]. For an unof-
ficial translation, see https://www.jura.uni-hamburg.de/die-fakultaet/professuren/pro-
elss/dateien-valentin/agreement-sea-of-azov. See Schatz & Koval, supra note 53, at 278. 
Those authors are of the view that under the agreement and subsequent statements the Sea 
of Azov was recognized as internal waters. 
56. Agreement on Cooperation, supra note 55, art. 2(1). See also Schatz & Koval, supra 
note 53, at 285. The authors opine that the use of the term “freedom of navigation” was 
likely accidental and not meant to reflect the freedom of the high seas under Article 87 of 
UNCLOS.  
57. Agreement on Cooperation, supra note 55, art. 2(2). 
58. Id. art. 2(3).  
59. Schatz & Koval, supra note 53, at 285. 
60. Skaridov, supra note 53; Schatz & Koval, supra note 53.  











issues presented for international adjudication.62 To address those, the tribu-
nals before which the three cases were filed must tackle the overarching 
question of sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula. 
 
V. THE BLACK SEA CASES BEFORE ITLOS AND THE                                     
ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Legal issues concerning the Black Sea have been at the forefront of interna-
tional courts and tribunals for over a decade. The first case to be brought 
was Georgia’s institution of proceedings on August 12, 2008, before the ICJ 
against the Russian Federation, contending that Russia’s actions in Georgia 
were in breach of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.63 While the application did not directly 
concern legal issues regarding the Black Sea and did not proceed beyond the 
preliminary objection stage, the case nevertheless marked a precedent that 
would be followed by Ukraine against Russia for its actions in the Black Sea, 
Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait. 
Then, on January 16, 2017, Ukraine instituted proceedings against Russia 
before the ICJ, alleging violations of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.64 The claims 
relate to events taking place in eastern Ukraine and the situation in Crimea. 
Ukraine contended that the Russian Federation had failed to take all practi-
cable measures to prevent and counter the commission of terrorism financ-
ing offenses committed in eastern Ukraine that began in the spring of 2014 
and had engaged in a campaign to deprive the Crimean Tatars and ethnic 
Ukrainians in Crimea of their political, civil, economic, social, and cultural 
rights, and pursued a policy and practice of racial discrimination against 
 
62. Skaridov, supra note 53, at 224–25; Schatz & Koval, supra note 53, at 277–78. 
63. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Geor. v Russ.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2011 I.C,J. Rep. 
70 (Apr. 1). 
64. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 558 
(Nov. 8) [hereinafter Application of the ICSFT and CERD]. See also Iryna Marchuk, Appli-
cation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Fed-











those communities.65 The Court found it had jurisdiction and rejected all of 
Russia’s preliminary objections.66 
On September 16, 2016, Ukraine served a notification and statement of 
claim under Annex VII of UNCLOS on the Russian Federation.67 More re-
cently, on March 31, 2019, Ukraine provided notification under UNCLOS 
Article 287 and Annex VII Article 1 that it was instituting arbitral proceed-
ings for the capture and detention of the three Ukrainian naval vessels and 
the twenty-four servicemen on board that had occurred on November 25, 
2018.68 At its core, the case concerns the coastal State rights of Ukraine and 
Russia in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait. Ukraine also filed a 
request for provisional measures under Article 290(5) before ITLOS pend-
ing establishment of the arbitral tribunal.69 
 
A. The Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Arbitral Case 
 
In its notification and statement of claim in the Dispute Concerning Coastal State 
Rights arbitration, Ukraine presented the tribunal with a long list of requests 
to adjudge, including, inter alia, recognizing Ukraine as having exclusive rights 
to engage in, authorize, and regulate exploration and exploitation of the nat-
ural resources, including drilling-related to hydrocarbons, and to authorize 
and regulate fishing in those areas of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov where 
Russia had not challenged Ukraine’s sovereignty before February 2014.70 In 
addition, to declare that the “Russian Federation shall refrain from prevent-
ing Ukrainian vessels from exploiting in a sustainable manner the living re-
sources in the areas of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov,” again in those areas 
Russia had not challenged Ukraine’s sovereignty before February 201471 and 
that Ukraine had the right of passage through the Kerch Strait.72 
Ukraine’s memorial provided another long list of violations of UNCLOS 
provisions allegedly committed by the Russian Federation. These included, 
inter alia, interference with Ukraine’s rights to hydrocarbon resources and 
living resources in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, and 
 
65. Application of the ICSFT and CERD, supra note 64, ¶ 18. 
66. Id. ¶ 134. 
67. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2, 8.  
68. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels, supra note 3, pmbl. 
69. Immunity of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels, supra note 4.  
70. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 9(a), (c). 
71. Id. ¶ 9(d).  











Ukraine’s UNCLOS rights and duties concerning underwater cultural herit-
age.73 It further alleged that Russia had embarked on a campaign of illegal 
construction in the Kerch Strait that threatened navigation and the marine 
environment and had violated its duty to cooperate with Ukraine to address 
pollution at sea.74  
The Russian Federation contested the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction on 
the grounds that the dispute, in essence, concerned Ukraine’s claim to sov-
ereignty over Crimea and was therefore not a dispute concerning the inter-
pretation or application of UNCLOS.75 Russia also asserted that UNCLOS 
did not regulate internal waters, such as the Sea of Azov and the Kerch 
Strait.76 In addition, Russia invoked the military activities and law enforce-
ment exceptions77 under UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b), which creates an ex-
ception for States from compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms for “dis-
putes concerning military activities, including military activities by govern-
ment vessels . . . in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law 
enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or juris-
diction.”78 It also argued that certain matters relating to fisheries, the protec-
tion and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research, 
navigation, and the living resources were excluded from the tribunal’s juris-
diction.79  
The tribunal to date has only issued its preliminary objections award. Yet, 
on the overarching issue of sovereignty over Crimea, the award contains im-
portant points about the tribunal’s approach to the scope and application of 
UNCLOS on the arguments raised by Ukraine should the case proceed to 
the merits phase. In responding to the preliminary objections, as discussed 
below, the tribunal has attempted to strike a balance that acknowledges this 
reality but also preserves the case for the next phase. The ultimate question 
is what influence will the final award have over unresolved issues surround-
ing the sovereignty of Crimea, the legal status of the Sea of Azov and the 
 
73. Id. ¶ 17(a)–(h). 
74. Id. ¶ 17(j)–(p).  
75. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch 
Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), Case No. 2017-06, PCA Case Repository, Preliminary Objections of 
the Russian Federation, ¶ 47 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2019) [hereinafter Dispute Concerning Coastal 
State Rights Preliminary Objections]  
76. Id. ¶ 117.  
77. Id. ¶ 137.  
78. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 298(1)(b).  
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According to Russia, the core issue underlying Ukraine’s claims was sover-
eignty over Crimea, which is precluded under UNCLOS Article 288(1).80 
Ukraine countered by alleging that as Russia had acted unlawfully against 
Ukraine and Crimea, there was no sovereignty dispute.81 In the alternative, 
Ukraine argued that even if the case did entail a sovereignty dispute, it was 
ancillary to the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of Article 
288(1).82 
In examining the case, the tribunal recognized the relationship between 
Ukraine’s claims and Crimea’s legal status. It concluded the dispute over sov-
ereignty was not ancillary to the dispute concerning the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS.83 It understood that sovereignty and the question 
of whether Russia or Ukraine was the “coastal State” was a prerequisite to 
its decision on a significant number of Ukraine’s claims.84 This issue arose 
because Ukraine’s claim to be the coastal State was premised on its sover-
eignty over Crimea, a premise the tribunal found could not be taken at face 
value.85 The question then was whether that precluded it from exercising ju-
risdiction over the case.  
In deciding the question, the tribunal followed the approach of the tri-
bunal in the Chagos arbitration, which stated  
 
 
80. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 161; Dispute Con-
cerning Coastal State Rights Preliminary Objections, supra note 75, ¶ 47. 
81. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 161. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. ¶ 195. The tribunal followed the approach of the tribunal in the Chagos case, 
which had also raised conflicting claims of sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago by the 
United Kingdom and Mauritius. In that case, Mauritius had challenged the right of the 
United Kingdom to establish a marine protected area in the archipelago because it was not 
the coastal State. The United Kingdom, in turn, challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction under 
Article 288(1)(a)(i) on the grounds that “sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago consti-
tutes ‘the real issue in the case’” and not a dispute concerning the interpretation and appli-
cation of UNCLOS. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 2011-03, 
PCA Case Repository, Award, ¶ 164 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Chagos Arbitration]. 
84. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 195. 











a dispute over sovereignty does not definitively answer the question of ju-
risdiction. There remains the question of the extent to which Article 288(1) 
accords the Tribunal jurisdiction in respect of a dispute over land sover-
eignty when, as here, that dispute touches in some ancillary manner on mat-
ters regulated by the Convention.86 
 
The tribunal ultimately agreed with the Russian Federation’s position that it 
did not have jurisdiction over Ukraine’s claims.87 The tribunal found that the 
territorial sovereignty dispute over Crimea was “not a minor issue ancillary 
to the dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion.”88 However, this was not a wholesale rejection of its jurisdiction. The 
tribunal qualified its finding only “to the extent that a ruling of the Arbitral Tribu-
nal on the merits of Ukraine’s claims necessarily requires it to decide, directly or implicitly, 
on the sovereignty of either Party over Crimea.”89 Evidently unwillingly to make a 
final disposition of the case and based on the interest of procedural fairness, 
the tribunal maintained jurisdiction but required Ukraine to revise its memo-
rial “so as to take full account of the scope of, and limits to, the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction as determined in the present Award.” 90  
There is no doubt that the core of this case concerns the disputed sov-
ereignty over Crimea. So, as was the case in the Chagos case, the tribunal 
cannot decide which country is the coastal State without determining sover-
eignty questions. However, this does not prevent the tribunal from deciding 
associated matters under dispute that don’t transgress into sovereignty is-
sues. 
 
86. Chagos Arbitration, supra note 83, ¶ 213 (emphasis added). The South China Sea 
arbitration raised similar issues of territorial sovereignty issues that possibly precluded the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal. The South China Sea is an area with a complex array 
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was able to uncouple sovereignty issues over disputed offshore features from the question 
of the status of such features under UNCLOS Article 121. The tribunal found violations of 
the environmental protection provisions of UNCLOS without determining sovereignty, im-
plicitly recognizing such obligations as erga omnes. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. 
China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Repository, Award, ¶ 927 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). See 
also Nilufer Oral, The South China Sea Arbitral Award, Part XII of UNCLOS, and the Protection 
and Preservation of the Marine Environment, in SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION 223 (S. Jaya-
kumar, Tommy Koh, Robert Beckman, Tara Davenport & Hao Duy Phan eds., 2018) 
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88. Id. ¶ 195. 
89. Id. ¶ 197 (emphasis added). 











2. The Status of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait as Internal Waters 
 
At this preliminary stage, the tribunal had to determine whether its jurisdic-
tion over alleged disputes concerning the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait 
was precluded because they constituted internal waters (or historic bays). 
According to Russia, internal waters and historic bays fell outside the scope 
of UNCLOS; therefore, the tribunal would lack jurisdiction under Article 
288(1) as it was not a dispute calling for the interpretation or application of 
UNCLOS.91 Ukraine rejected Russia’s claims that the Sea of Azov and the 
Kerch Strait are internal waters. According to Ukraine, “the Sea of Azov is 
an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea within the meaning of the Convention, 
containing a territorial sea and exclusive economic zone, and the Kerch Strait 
is a strait used for international navigation.”92 
As discussed above, the substance of the issue involves a complicated 
history of the transition from USSR republics to independent States in 1991. 
Ukraine and Russia agree that the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait were 
once internal waters of the USSR. Russia takes the position that status con-
tinued following the transition. The question is whether the status changed 
in 1991 when the USSR was replaced by two independent States bordering 
the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait. This was a source of ongoing discussions 
between Ukraine and Russia, and the question was only partially resolved 
under the 2003 agreement on the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov.93 In the 
agreement, both Ukraine and Russia recognized the Sea of Azov and Kerch 
Strait as historically internal waters.94 But what does “historically” mean? Ac-
cording to Russia, at least for purposes of the arbitration case, it marked an 
acknowledgment that the status of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait, includ-
ing their status as internal waters, remained unchanged after the dissolution 
of the USSR and the independence of Ukraine. Therefore, UNCLOS was 
applicable. Russia also referred to the ICJ’s Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute judgment95 in support of its argument that, like the Gulf of Fonseca, 
 
91. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Preliminary Objections, supra note 75, ¶ 
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94. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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the Sea of Azov is an example of pluri-State internal waters,96 a view that 
Ukraine contests. 
While Ukraine does not contest that in the past the Sea of Azov and 
Kerch Strait were internal waters of the USSR, according to Ukraine, their 
status changed after USSR’s dissolution and that they no longer constitute 
internal waters,97 arguing that the 2003 agreement acknowledged this change 
of status. Ukraine’s position is that the Sea of Azov is a semi-enclosed or 
enclosed sea under UNCLOS Article 122, within which there are territorial 
seas and exclusive economic zones of the two States.98 Ukraine also argued 
that under UNCLOS, seas bordered by more than one State could not be 
internal waters.99 It disputed Russia’s reliance on the “exceptional” notion of 
pluri-State internal waters (the Gulf of Fonseca). Further, it argued that even 
if this were possible, the Sea of Azov did not fulfill the requirements for such 
recognition.100 
Finally, Ukraine disagreed with Russia that internal waters fall outside 
the scope of UNCLOS. Ukraine also put forth the view, citing the jurisdic-
tional award in the South China Sea arbitration,101 that Russia’s reliance on the 
status of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait as internal waters, or in the alter-
native historic waters, should be deferred to the merits stage of the proceed-
ings.102 Specifically, the South China Sea tribunal stated its jurisdiction would 
be “dependent on the nature of any historic rights . . . and whether they are 
covered by the exclusion from jurisdiction over ‘historic bays or titles’” in 
Article 298.103 It held that the nature and validity of any historic rights 
 
96. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 208. In addition, 
Russia cited Arbitration Between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia 
(Croat. v. Slovn.), Case No. 2012-04, PCA Case Repository, Final Award, ¶ 209 (Perm. Ct. 
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Slovenia, which formerly constituted the internal waters of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, retained its status after that State’s dissolution.  
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99. Id. ¶ 216. 
100. Id. ¶ 218. 
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claimed by China was a merits determination and that the possible jurisdic-
tional objections concerning the dispute “therefore do not possess an exclu-
sively preliminary character.”104 
Ukraine alleges the Kerch Strait is a strait used for international naviga-
tion under UNCLOS Article 37.105 Russia, however, claims exclusive sover-
eignty over the Kerch Strait subject to the rights granted to Ukraine, such as 
freedom of navigation for Ukrainian ships and a right to free passage for 
foreign non-military vessels sailing to and from Ukrainian ports under the 
2003 cooperation agreement.106 In other words, Russia appears to have taken 
the position that the agreement entailed Russia granting specific rights to 
Ukraine and that it was not a mutual agreement on shared sovereignty over 
the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. 
In its award on jurisdiction, the tribunal reaffirmed that the legal status 
of the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait is “interwoven with the merits of the 
present dispute” that have not yet been pleaded.107 The tribunal found that 
the determination depended “to a large extent, on how the Parties have 
treated them in the period following the independence of Ukraine,”108 indi-
cating the positions of the parties would come from subsequent agreements 
between them, their actual practice in the areas concerned, and their actions 
vis-à-vis third States. The tribunal emphasized that “[i]n particular, this 
would require the arbitral tribunal to scrutinize the conduct of the Parties 
with respect to such matters as navigation, exploitation of natural resources, 
and protection of the marine environment in the Sea of Azov and Kerch 
Strait.”109  
 The tribunal was not entirely convinced by Russia’s argument that UN-
CLOS does not include a regime regulating internal waters and that a dispute 
relating to events occurring in internal waters does not concern the interpre-
tation or application of UNCLOS.110 Moreover, in perhaps a preview of its 
decision on the issue, the tribunal referred to ITLOS’s Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission advisory opinion111 when stating the “obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment under Article 192 [of UNCLOS] applies 
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to all maritime areas,” which would, according to the Black Sea tribunal, 
“undoubtedly include internal waters.”112 Indeed, the tribunal made it quite 
clear that it was more concerned with whether the dispute involves conduct 
of the parties that implicates or raises questions on the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS.113 That the events took place in internal waters is 
irrelevant to the tribunal. Thus, it is the conduct giving rise to the dispute 
and not its location in a specific maritime area that determines the applica-
bility of Article 288(1) according to the tribunal. This position offers addi-
tional clues to how it will analyze the issues without entering into the con-
troversy of sovereignty over Crimea.114  
UNCLOS provides little guidance on whether the dispute concerns the 
“interpretation or application of this Convention,” the prerequisite for juris-
diction under UNCLOS’s compulsory dispute settlement procedures.115 
UNCLOS does not provide a regime of rights and obligations for internal 
waters as it does for other maritime zones. Although the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission advisory opinion and the South China Sea arbitral award strongly 
suggest that internal waters fall within UNCLOS for jurisdictional purposes, 
it is likely that when this case proceeds to the merits, the tribunal will focus 
more on the conduct of Russia and Ukraine between 1991 and 2014 rather 
than make substantive pronouncements on defining internal waters, historic 
bays, or semi-enclosed seas. 
 
3. The Military Activities and Law Enforcement Activities Exception under 
UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b) 
 
Russia invoked the opt-out provision of Article 298(1)(b) excluding military 
and law enforcement activities from compulsory dispute resolution proce-
dures when ratifying UNCLOS.116 In this case, Russia asserted the military 
 
112. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 295. 
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114. This would be very consistent with the approach taken by the tribunal in the South 
China Sea arbitration in which it objectively assessed maritime features and China’s claim to 
historic title without determining sovereignty. And likewise, the tribunal in that case deter-
mined whether China had violated provisions related to protection and preservation of the 
marine environment as an obligation erga omnes that applied in all maritime zones.  
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activities exception through a somewhat derivative fashion against the back-
ground of the 2014 conflict with Ukraine. In addition, Russia relied on 
Ukraine’s claim that Russia’s military vessels had used physical force to ex-
clude it from access to hydrocarbon fields and fisheries. 
The tribunal was clear in its rejection of the Russian arguments. The tri-
bunal stated that the military activities exception was not triggered simply 
because the actions took place against the broader background of an alleged 
armed conflict. The standard the tribunal applied was “whether ‘certain spe-
cific acts subject of Ukraine’s complaints’ constitute military activities.”117 
The tribunal stated “a mere ‘causal’ or historical link between certain alleged 
military activities and the activities in dispute cannot be sufficient to bar an 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction under Article 298, paragraph 1, subparagraph 
(b) of the Convention.”118 Moreover, the tribunal stated the “mere involve-
ment or presence of military vessels alone” is not sufficient “to trigger the 
military activities exception,” and referred to the South China Sea arbitral 
award.119  
The tribunal discarded Russia’s invocation of military activities based on 
Ukraine’s claim that physical force had been used to deny it access to hydro-
carbon and fisheries resources. According to the tribunal, the alleged use of 
force was not enough to give rise to the military activities’ exception. It 
looked to the “broader context” of where the activities took place and took 
into consideration the civilian nature of the hydrocarbon commercial activi-
ties and the civilian legal framework for regulating fisheries.120 Explaining its 
approach, the tribunal found that “the use of physical force alleged by 
Ukraine does not turn the dispute into one concerning military activities; 
rather such alleged force appears to have been directed towards maintaining 
civilian activities such as the exploitation of hydrocarbons and fisheries.”121 
Additionally, regardless of the type of vessels involved, the tribunal focused 
 
117. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights Award, supra note 2, ¶ 331. 
118. Id. ¶ 330. 
119. Id. ¶ 334. In that case, while China had directly used military vessels and personnel 
to engage in land reclamation activities, the Tribunal did not find that this constituted mili-
tary activities within the meaning of Article 298(1)(b). South China Sea Arbitration, supra 
note 101, ¶ 1203(A)(6)(b). Of course, an important aspect was that China had itself charac-
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Zou & Qiang Ye, Interpretation and Application of Article 298 of the Law of the Sea Convention in 
Recent Annex VII Arbitrations: An Appraisal, 48 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL 
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on the nature of the activities and concluded that they could not be “objec-
tively classified as military in nature.”122  
Authors have been critical of previous decisions by tribunals that have 
given very limited, and according to some, conflicting applications of Article 
298(1)(b). Zou & Ye note this conflicting interpretation in the South China 
Sea award in which the tribunal excluded application of the military activities 
exception for Chinese military vessels used in land reclamation activities but 
then applied the exception where Chinese non-military vessels attempted to 
prevent Philippines military vessels from resupplying its military personnel 
stationed at Second Thomas Shoal.123 
The Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights award provides no clarification, 
instead indicating there is no common standard for determining the scope 
of military activities, the tribunal stating, 
 
there is no consistent practice as to the scope of activities that are to be 
regarded as being exercised by “military” vessels, aircraft and personnel. 
Forces that some governments treat as civilian or law enforcement forces 
may be designated as military by others, even though they may undertake 
comparable tasks. In addition, many States rely on their military forces for 
non-military functions, such as disaster relief, evacuation, or the reestab-
lishment of public order.124  
 
It seems that in recent cases, tribunals appear to be against a stricto sensu in-
terpretation for the application of the military activities’ exception, instead 
preferring a case-by-case approach based on the combination of objective 
criteria.125 
The tribunal rejected Russia’s invocation of the law enforcement excep-
tion for activities related to the exercise of sovereign rights of a State in its 
declared exclusive economic zone.126 The overarching issue here was the dis-
pute over sovereignty between Ukraine and Russia over Crimea. According 
to the tribunal, because it had already declined to exercise jurisdiction over 
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125. See also Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels, supra note 3, separate opinion by 
Gao, J., ¶ 22 (“Evaluation of military activities should be based on a combination of factors, 
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questions related to determining the coastal State, “[i]t follows that entitle-
ments to adjacent maritime zones generated by the coast of Crimea, includ-
ing any exclusive economic zones, cannot be determined.”127 Given the un-
certainty concerning whether Ukraine or Russia had sovereignty rights over 
the exclusive economic zone where the incident took place, the tribunal de-
cided the conditions for the application of Article 298(1)(b) had not been 
met.128 
 
4. Delimitation and Historic Bays or Titles Exception 
 
On the question of the application of the sea boundary delimitation excep-
tion to compulsory dispute resolution under Article 298(a)(i) claimed by Rus-
sia, the tribunal found it inapplicable because it would require a decision im-
plicitly or explicitly on sovereignty over Crimea.129 The tribunal reserved 
Russia’s historic bays or titles objection to the tribunal’s jurisdiction for the 
merits stage, stating the disputes relating to historic bays or titles are “closely 
intertwined with the Russian Federation’s arguments concerning historical 
title in support of its internal waters objection.”130 Thus, for the tribunal, 
deciding this objection was not an exclusively preliminary matter and in-
volved the merits. 
 
5. Fisheries, Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment, and 
Navigation 
 
The USSR’s declaration when ratifying UNCLOS opted for a special arbitral 
tribunal under Annex VIII for the consideration of matters related to fish-
eries, protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine scien-
tific research, and navigation, including pollution from vessels and dump-
ing.131 A similar declaration was made by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re-
public when signing UNCLOS and again in its ratification on July 26, 1999.132 
 
127. Id. ¶ 357. 
128. Id. ¶¶ 356–58. 
129. Id. ¶ 382. 
130. Id. ¶ 388. 
131. Id. ¶ 414. See also Russian Declaration, supra note 116.  











Russia argued that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over these matters 
since they belonged to the “jurisdictional domain” of Annex VIII tribu-
nals.133 To date, there has been no Annex VIII special arbitral tribunal con-
stituted, and it is unlikely one will be constituted in the near future. The rea-
son provided by the tribunal in rejecting the Russian objection was to avoid 
the possibility of inconsistent outcomes should more than one tribunal be 
deciding different aspects of the same case.134 It noted that this was especially 
the case since it did “not consider each of Ukraine’s submissions made in 
the Notification and Statement of Claim and the Memorial to constitute a 
distinct and separate dispute, but rather to be part of a single, unified dispute.”135 
The tribunal reasoned it would not be in the interest of justice for the 
tribunal to hear parts of the case and not others. In addition to its concerns 
about fragmentation, the tribunal also considered the parties’ increase in 
costs and litigation time.136 
 
B. Detention of Three Ukrainian Naval Vessels case 
 
As discussed above, since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federa-
tion in 2014, the legal status of the Kerch Strait, which connects the Black 
Sea and the Sea of Azov, has been disputed by the parties. Against this back-
ground, the arrest and detention of three Ukrainian naval vessels and their 
twenty-four servicemen by Russian authorities on November 25, 2018, 
brought international adjudication to the question of the legal status and re-
spective rights of the parties in the Kerch Strait.137 
Pending the constitution of an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, Ukraine filed 
a request for provisional measures pursuant to Article 290(5) of UNCLOS, 
asking ITLOS to order the Russian Federation to promptly release and re-
turn the Ukrainian vessels, and suspend any criminal proceedings against the 
servicemen, refrain from initiating new proceedings, and release and allow 
them to return to Ukraine. In doing so, Ukraine argued that the seizure and 
detention of the Ukrainian naval vessels by the Russian Federation consti-
tuted a breach of its obligation under UNCLOS to accord foreign naval ves-
sels complete immunity under Articles 32, 58, 95, and 96 of UNCLOS.138 In 
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addition, Ukraine asserted that the twenty-four crewmembers’ detention 
amounted to a breach of Russia’s obligations under those articles. Notably, 
the Russian Federation did not participate in the proceedings before the tri-
bunal but transmitted a memorandum that explained its position.139 
In its May 25, 2019 Order, ITLOS granted provisional measures, which 
were approved by a vote of nineteen to one, requiring the Russian Federation 
to (i) immediately release the Ukrainian naval vessels and return them to the 
custody of Ukraine and (ii) release the twenty-four detained Ukrainian ser-
vicemen and allow them to return to Ukraine.140 In addition, the tribunal 
required both Ukraine and the Russian Federation to refrain from taking any 
action that might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Annex 
VII arbitral tribunal.141 
With respect to the basis on which the jurisdiction of the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal could be founded, the tribunal initially had to determine 
whether the dispute was a “dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion” of UNCLOS.142 Ukraine argued that Articles 286 and 288 provided the 
basis of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.143 The tribunal, while observing that the 
memorandum of the Russian Federation “did not directly respond to this 
argument,”144 determined that the arrest and detention of the vessels and 
their crews demonstrated that the parties were positioned differently with 
regard to whether there had been a breach of the obligations under Articles 
32, 58, 95, and 96.145  
In concluding that the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would have prima fa-
cie jurisdiction as required under Article 290(5) of UNCLOS, the tribunal 
considered that there was a dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of UNCLOS.146 However, it should be noted that since the order was 
 
139. ITLOS noted that “Ukraine should not be put at a disadvantage because of the 
non-appearance of the Russian Federation in the proceedings and that the Tribunal ‘must 
therefore identify and assess the respective rights of the Parties involved on the best availa-
ble evidence.’” Id. ¶ 29. It cited the order in the Arctic Sunrise case. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. 
Russ.), Case No. 22, Provisional Measures, Order of Nov. 23, 2013, ITLOS Rep. 230, ¶¶ 
56–57. 
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for provisional measures, this finding of prima facie jurisdiction does not 
definitively fulfill the jurisdictional requirements to be met by the Annex VII 
arbitral tribunal.147 
As a secondary question on the issue of jurisdiction, the Russian Feder-
ation asserted that the case must be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal under the military and law enforcement Article 298(1)(b) ex-
ception,148 just as it had done in the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights ar-
bitration case.149 In response, Ukraine asserted that “the dispute does not 
concern military activities, but rather law enforcement activities, and that the 
declarations, therefore, do not exclude the present dispute from the jurisdic-
tion of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.”150 The tribunal set out the issue to 
be “whether the dispute . . . concerns military activities,”151 and based on the 
information and evidence available to it, concluded that Article 298(1)(b) did 
not apply.152 
This order became the first time ITLOS interpreted Article 298(1)(b).153 
In reaching its conclusion, the tribunal noted that the distinction between 
military and law enforcement activities “must be based primarily on an ob-
jective evaluation of the nature of the activities in question, taking into ac-
count the relevant circumstances in each case.”154 The tribunal employed a 
case-by-case approach. Three circumstances were relevant to the tribunal’s 
evaluation.155 First, the underlying dispute related to the passage of naval 
vessels, but the tribunal avoided a general statement that passage of naval 
vessels was per se a military activity.156 Second, the tribunal noted that the 
core dispute arose from the parties’ differing interpretations of the Kerch 
Strait’s legal status, and this was not military in nature.157 Third, the tribunal 
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observed that the context in which the Russian Federation employed force 
in the process of the arrest and detention of the Ukrainian naval vessels was 
particularly relevant. It noted that the Ukrainian vessels had apparently given 
up their attempt to transit the Kerch Strait, had turned around, and were 
sailing away when force was used. Under those circumstances, the force was 
characterized as having taken place in a law enforcement operation rather 
than a military operation;158 thus, Article 298(1)(b)’s military activities excep-
tion did not apply.159 
The decision is not without its critics. It has been pointed out that the 
distinction drawn between military and law enforcement activities by ITLOS 
is at odds with the interpretation and distinction made by the arbitral tribunal 
in the South China Sea arbitration.160 In this regard, the application and inter-
pretation of these exceptions in the merits stage in this case, as well as in the 
Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights arbitration, in addition to their im-
portance to the future of international law in the Black Sea, will (hopefully) 




This article seeks not merely to provide a legal overview of the cases con-
cerning the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait but to examine 
them within the lens of history. The current legal disputes concerning the 
Black Sea should be seen in the context of a clash between two competing 
visions of the applicable legal regime. On the one hand, the Soviet doctrine 
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of closed seas has historically described the Russian policy, ensuring regional 
stability and placing significant limitations on the freedom of navigation of 
warships of non-littoral States in the Black Sea. On the other hand, the 
changes brought about by the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 opened the 
Black Sea to the increasing presence of Western powers, especially NATO, 
which has close relations with five Black Sea States and provides military 
support to Georgia and Ukraine. In this background, the conflict over Cri-
mea in 2014 can be better understood, although it does not justify unlawful 
actions under international law. 
The cases brought by Ukraine against Russia all stem from events flow-
ing from the annexation of Crimea in 2014. There is no doubt that Ukraine 
is utilizing UNCLOS and its compulsory dispute settlement mechanism to 
gain recognition of its sovereignty, even if implicitly, over Crimea through 
the international adjudicative process. However, while UNCLOS provides 
the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism, Ukraine still had to over-
come the legal hurdles of jurisdiction and exceptions aptly raised by Russia.  
The Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights tribunal correctly recognized 
that the dispute over sovereignty was the crux of the matter. In this regard, 
the tribunal would not be in a position to adjudge and declare Ukraine’s 
rights in maritime zones as this would entail determining the coastal State. 
The tribunal, however, kept the case alive and placed the responsibility on 
Ukraine to revise its memorial. Past cases have demonstrated that such revi-
sion is quite feasible, especially in relation to questions concerning the pro-
tection and preservation of the marine environment and the determination 
of the status of maritime features.161  
Ukraine’s claims arising from Russia’s construction of the Kerch Bridge 
raises and interference with its navigational rights would provide the first 
opportunity to revisit the regime of straits under international law since the 
ICJ’s order in the 1991 Passage through the Great Belt case.162 However, the tri-
bunal will likely focus on the 2003 agreement and not venture into the 
broader context of the regime of straits under Part III of UNCLOS.163 On 
the other hand, the allegation that Russia failed to protect the environment 
and to cooperate with Ukraine would directly implicate rights and obligations 
under Part XII of UNCLOS.164 These are issues that can be divorced from 
sovereignty questions, as was seen in the South China Sea case. 
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 These Black Sea cases present an important addition to the recent trend 
of cases with underlying disputed sovereignty matters being brought under 
the UNCLOS dispute resolution procedures. In the Chagos and the South 
China Sea arbitrations, the tribunals, while acknowledging UNCLOS’s limi-
tations in relation to sovereignty issues, provided decisions on the merits. 
The same promises to be the case for the Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights 
in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait, which awaits the revised version 
of Ukraine’s memorial. Through UNCLOS, these unresolved legal disputes 
pending before the international tribunals seek answers that could influence 
the future of the Black Sea, Crimea, and the Sea of Azov. 
 
